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An Affair on Every Continent: 
French Reaction to the Foreign Press 
during the Dreyfus Affair
David Murrell
 On October 15, 1894, artillery captain Alfred Dreyfus 
was summoned to the French Ministry of  War in Paris. At the 
time, the Jewish soldier, born in the northeastern French region 
of  Alsace, thought nothing of  the matter, believing he was merely 
due for his annual inspection. The only peculiarity was that he 
was specifically ordered to wear civilian clothing, but this seemed 
unimportant. Upon arriving at the ministry building, Lieutenant 
Colonel Charles du Paty de Clam met Dreyfus and asked the artil-
lery captain to compose a letter on his behalf, citing a sore finger. 
Dreyfus obliged, still unaware that anything was amiss. It was only 
after he had finished the letter, when du Paty de Clam rose and an-
nounced emphatically, “In the name of  the law, I arrest you; you 
are accused of  the crime of  high treason,”1 that Dreyfus realized 
this was no ordinary inspection.
 Such were the humble beginnings of  what came to be 
known as the Dreyfus affair, an international scandal that wracked 
France, as well as the rest of  the world, from 1894 until 1906. 
Specifically, Dreyfus had been accused of  passing on French army 
secrets to the German military attaché in Paris, Maximilien von 
Schwartzkoppen. As evidence, senior officials on the French Gen-
eral Staff  cited a document which would come to be known as the 
bordereau, an unsigned sheet of  paper containing sensitive French 
military information that had been picked up by a French spy in 
Schwartzkoppen’s wastebasket at the German embassy. When du 
Paty de Clam summoned Dreyfus on that mid-October morning, 
his finger was not really injured. It was a trap, meant to prove that 
Dreyfus’s hand had written the incriminating document. The evi-
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dence was good enough for du Paty de Clam, for he immediately 
ordered Dreyfus’s incarceration. Dreyfus was then convicted by 
a closed-door military tribunal in December 1894 and sent to 
Devil’s Island, a penal colony off  the coast of  French Guiana, 
South America, notorious for its brutal conditions. With Dreyfus 
shipped halfway across the world and locked in a stone cabin 
measuring four square meters,2 the story of  a traitorous Jewish 
officer ought to have ended once and for all.
 Without the mass press that was burgeoning throughout 
Europe and, indeed, much of  the world, this might very well 
have been the case. The turn of  the twentieth century, however, 
brought with it a newly powerful actor: the modern newspaper. 
Illustration of  Alfred Dreyfus’s degradation ceremony 
at the École Militaire
46     David Murrell
An Affair on Every Continent
In France, the foundations for a literate, engaged citizenry were 
laid decades earlier with the adoption of  the 1833 Loi Guizot, 
which established primary schools throughout the country and 
created a new base of  readers in addition to the urban dwellers 
and educated classes.3 Not only were these new segments of  so-
ciety now capable of  reading, but they also had access to a novel 
brand of  popular press which, according to historian Christophe 
Charle, “abandoned the political function that dominated the 
press, instead choosing to distract and move the new readers, 
leading to the development of  so-called tabloids.”4 With its di-
verse cast of  characters, the Dreyfus affair served as fantastic 
tabloid fodder throughout Europe. Whether one was a “Dreyfu-
sard” supporting the artillery captain, or an “anti-Dreyfusard” in 
favor of  the guilty verdict, there was no shortage of  heroes and 
villains to support. 
 The case itself  had an inherently dramatic quality to it, 
for it soon became evident that a number of  the documents used 
to convict Dreyfus in his first court-martial were forgeries cre-
ated by members of  the French military. Colonel Georges Pic-
quart, one of  Dreyfus’s earliest defenders in the military, also 
realized that the leaks to Schwartzkoppen had continued even 
after Dreyfus’s arrest, which led him to discover the real traitor, 
a soldier by the name of  Ferdinand Walsin Esterhazy. While the 
French military had no desire to reopen the Dreyfus case, even 
wrongly clearing Esterhazy of  any wrongdoing in a court-mar-
tial, the press was now reporting on the various developments in 
the nascent affair with great zeal. This was in large part thanks 
to an article from a French newspaper, Georges Clemenceau’s 
L’Aurore, which helped spark serious international interest in the 
Dreyfus affair. That article was “J’accuse…!,” celebrated French 
novelist Émile Zola’s seminal open letter to French President Fé-
lix Fauré, published January 13, 1898. In “J’accuse,” Zola alleged 
that a massive conspiracy was being propagated by the French 
government and military to cover up Dreyfus’s innocence. In 
the aftermath of  the article’s publication, it became clear that the 
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French government would not succeed in burying the Dreyfus 
case, for Zola had managed to transform it into a bona fide inter-
national scandal. Indeed, from 1898 onward, Zola’s open letter 
polarized individual citizens within France, while also galvaniz-
ing support for Dreyfus throughout the world in the pages of  
the foreign press.
 There would be many developments and revelations 
between January 1898 and August 1899, the month Dreyfus 
was recalled from Devil’s Island for a second military tribunal 
in Rennes, France. But in some ways, Zola’s “J’accuse,” impos-
ing such pressure upon the French government, fast-tracked 
the Dreyfus case straight to Rennes. Indeed, by this point, the 
Dreyfus affair had gripped France, as well as the rest of  Eu-
rope. In one Belgian town, the entire community put on a parade 
in advance of  the Rennes court-martial, complete with citizens 
dressed up as French officers and lawyers.5 It is conceivable that 
these Belgian townsfolk were not well-versed in the political and 
legal intricacies of  the Dreyfus affair. But to them, these details 
did not matter. They were drawn to the characters and the the-
atrics of  it all, as if  the affair itself  were a real-life play. This was 
the legacy of  the popular press, which highlighted narrative and 
drama over the more burdensome legal and political details.
 If  the French government was concerned about the po-
litical and social ramifications of  an incendiary article like Zola’s, 
then it was equally troubled by the new international tenor of  
the affair. Admittedly, these fears proved to be quite rational. 
On the day of  Dreyfus’s reconviction at Rennes, demonstrations 
broke out in favor of  the ex-captain around the world. From 
Egypt to Australia, and virtually everywhere in between, the 
message was the same: people were indignant that Dreyfus had 
been reconvicted, particularly given the revelations that many of  
the documents used to convict him had been fraudulent.6 The 
French consul in Melbourne, Australia, reported that the situa-
tion “could not be worse.”7 In Belgium, the press was described 
as having a “rare violence.”8 Tens of  thousands demonstrated 
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in favor of  Dreyfus at Hyde Park in London, England.9 And in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, a group of  socialists signed a petition 
condemning the verdict, with the hope that their message could 
be transmitted to Dreyfus’s lawyer, Fernand Labori.10
 In 1899, nearly five years after Dreyfus’s original convic-
tion, the case inspired more controversy than ever before. It was 
ultimately the risk of  a continued media fiasco that led French 
President Émile Loubet to offer Dreyfus a pardon, which the 
artillery captain accepted on September 19, 1899. This, how-
ever, did not bring about a calm denouement to the affair. In-
deed, the Dreyfus affair was like a Hydra: when one controversy 
Émile Zola’s “J’accuse…!”
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was settled, two more appeared in its place. Eventually, in 1904, 
Dreyfus’s lawyer submitted a request on behalf  of  his client for 
a new appeal. After a slow march through the French courts, 
the Supreme Court of  Appeal announced on July 12, 1906, that 
Alfred Dreyfus was innocent. The French Senate passed a bill to 
promote Dreyfus to the rank of  major within the army. The fol-
lowing decade, Dreyfus would serve alongside his countrymen as 
an artillery officer in the First World War. 
 The foreign press played an instrumental role during the 
affair, familiarizing individuals across borders and continents 
with the plight of  Dreyfus. These people then mobilized around 
the world, pressuring the French government to amend the ver-
dict. Newspapers worldwide, some utilizing news agencies such 
as Reuters and others hiring their own foreign correspondents, 
reported detailed updates on the affair on a daily basis. The ex-
tent of  the spread of  information was impressive, even by to-
day’s standards. In 1898, for instance, the London Times repub-
lished a letter, originally sent to a newspaper in Vienna, Austria, 
which had been written by an American woman living in a small 
Finnish town.11 The woman, describing the conditions in her vil-
lage, reported, “People here are so frightfully interested in [the 
affair]. Even the peasants in quite out of  the way places spoke 
about it to my husband on his last journey. The general opinion 
in this country is that Dreyfus is innocent.”12
 This sort of  article, which did not condemn the French 
state or military, was relatively benign as far as the French gov-
ernment was concerned. But there were still many other stories 
written by the foreign press that directly attacked the French 
government’s treatment of  Dreyfus and, at least implicitly and 
occasionally explicitly, encouraged its readers to protest against 
France. Such demonstrations and discourse inevitably hurt 
France’s reputation as a bastion of  justice and equality, a position 
it had enjoyed since the French Revolution in 1789. This change 
in perception was a central concern of  the French Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, which kept detailed reports from its consuls and 
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ambassadors abroad pertaining to the activities of  the foreign 
press.
 Of  much greater concern to the ministry, however, was 
the publication of  numerous articles, particularly in neighbor-
ing Britain, which subsequently trickled into France and served 
to reignite the debate surrounding Dreyfus. This phenomenon 
was especially prevalent during the years between Dreyfus’s first 
conviction in 1894 and the publication of  “J’accuse” in 1898, 
a period when the affair was by no means entrenched as an in-
ternational scandal. Most famously, in 1896, Mathieu Dreyfus, 
the brother of  Alfred, convinced the British Daily Chronicle to 
publish a false story proclaiming that his brother had escaped 
from Devil’s Island.13 Mathieu hoped this would keep his broth-
er’s name in the press and provide a reminder that the Dreyfus 
affair had not yet concluded. Ultimately, Mathieu’s gamble paid 
dividends as a number of  British papers picked up the story, 
prompting the French press to follow suit and thus keeping the 
Dreyfus scandal in the public consciousness in France.
 Given this volatile atmosphere, it should come as no sur-
prise that the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs sought to keep 
close tabs on the foreign media in order to control any discourse 
pertaining to Dreyfus. This desire to control information abroad 
led the French government to pursue attempts at censorship 
more broadly than it ever did with its own domestic press. Al-
though the French certainly spied on their own newspapers and 
reporters, the government never moved to prevent the publica-
tion of  a domestic news story. This was due to the Press Law of  
1881, which effectively guaranteed newspapers the freedom to 
print whatever they pleased. The French treatment of  the for-
eign press, on the other hand, was a different story, as the Minis-
try of  Foreign Affairs repeatedly attempted to intervene through 
diplomatic channels in order to limit the publication of  damning 
materials against the French state. Unfortunately for the French 
government, many of  the foreign countries that covered the af-
fair most aggressively (particularly Belgium, Britain, Germany, 
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and Switzerland) either had their own liberalized press laws or 
had no incentive to restrict the publication of  articles that were 
hostile to France. For these reasons, the French focused their 
censorship efforts, particularly within Europe, on theater pro-
ductions, which were not yet granted similar freedoms from gov-
ernment censors. Even on the few occasions when France did 
move to influence the press outside of  Europe, the country’s 
efforts were generally unsuccessful.
***
 Relative to the rest of  the world, the European press re-
ceived the vast majority of  attention from the Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs. This was expected, for Europeans were much closer to 
France geographically and thus more familiar with the country’s 
history and culture. Naturally, this geographic proximity enabled 
the European press to locate more sources and invest more in 
breaking stories over the course of  the entire affair, as opposed 
to covering only crucial events such as the Rennes court-martial. 
The shared cultural and historical understanding among Eu-
ropeans was a primary reason the French government was so 
concerned with European press coverage. Indeed, much of  the 
affair was couched in terms that were intra-European in nature, 
making it relevant to the entire continent. When the coverage 
was critical of  France, as it almost always was, this constituted a 
political threat. For instance, after the British Daily Mail coined 
the term in September 1899, much of  the European press began 
referring to the Dreyfus affair as France’s “moral Sedan,” con-
necting the scandal to France’s humiliating military defeat at the 
Battle of  Sedan in the Franco-Prussian War of  1870-71. More-
over, the European press had an incentive to market the affair in 
a way that appealed to Europeans on a broader level. In doing 
so, the press created a continent-wide scandal, involving various 
players from France, Germany, and Italy alike. It became impos-
sible for Europeans not to link the infiltration of  Maximilien von 
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Schwartzkoppen, the German spy to whom Dreyfus allegedly 
sold military secrets, to the French military and its involvement 
in the Franco-Prussian War. Similarly, the Dreyfusard European 
press could not help but frame the ex-captain’s convictions as a 
repudiation of  the gains of  the French Revolution. In this re-
gard, Europe was better equipped to cover the affair with vitriol 
and acumen than any other part of  the world.
 The Ministry of  Foreign Affairs devoted immense re-
sources to tracking the activities of  this international press. The 
department’s minister, Gabriel Hanotaux, received daily updates 
from his consular and ambassadorial staff  on the day’s foreign 
news. These dispatches took many different forms: press clip-
pings of  specific articles, hand-written translations, and detailed 
syntheses describing the coverage of  numerous papers. In the 
early days of  the affair, it was not a foregone conclusion that the 
foreign press would become obsessed with covering the case of  
Alfred Dreyfus. For instance, on November 6, 1897, the French 
ambassador to Germany wrote to Hanotaux, “the Affair in ques-
tion offers no direct interest for the German government.”14 The 
sentiment was echoed by the German press, and one German 
newspaper, La Gazette de la Croix, mentioned, “This whole ques-
tion is for France an internal affair, of  which we in Germany do 
not need to exaggerate the significance.”15
 This detachment disappeared in a matter of  weeks, fol-
lowing allegations in the French press that the German kaiser 
himself  dealt with Dreyfus and coordinated his espionage. Such 
an assertion transformed the Dreyfus affair in the eyes of  the 
German populace from an entirely French scandal into a calum-
ny that attacked the honor and reputation of  Germany. In other 
words, the affair became something of  a geopolitical conflict. As 
the French ambassador to Germany later described, “As a result 
of  all this, the German newspapers have modified their original 
attitude and no longer publish exclusively news articles about the 
affair.”16 Indeed, La Gazette de la Croix, which had downplayed 
the affair’s significance weeks earlier, now termed it France’s 
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“military Panama,” referring to the bribery scandal over the Pan-
ama Canal that walloped the French government in 1892. If  this 
anti-French sentiment was only burgeoning in Germany by the 
end of  November, it no doubt crystallized the following month. 
On December 12, 1897, Henri de Rochefort published an even 
more accusatory article in his popular newspaper L’Intransigeant, 
further implicating German Kaiser Wilhelm II.17
 This budding conflict with Germany was certainly trou-
bling for the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs. The French 
ambassador to Germany continued to provide numerous up-
dates on the “biased and Francophobic” writings in German 
newspapers, such as those by the Paris correspondent of  the Ber-
liner Tageblatt.18 Germany was expected to cover the basic facts of  
the affair, but this transition to aggressive anti-French opinion 
pieces did not bode well for Franco-German relations. Indeed, 
only two decades earlier, France had lost the mineral-rich terri-
tory of  Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. The relationship between 
the two European powers, therefore, was already tense. And for 
a country that wished to appear strong in the aftermath of  such 
a devastating military defeat, the Dreyfus affair seemed to do 
just the opposite for France, reflecting the image of  a nation in 
decline for all to see. In the context of  Franco-German relations, 
these small changes in public perception had tangible diplomatic 
consequences.
 Although no British diplomats were implicated in the 
Dreyfus affair, much of  the British press coverage has been un-
derstood by historians in similar geopolitical terms. As historian 
Ricky Lee Sherrod argues, British interest in the affair stemmed 
in part from fear over the prospect of  a diminishing role of  lib-
eralism—particularly as it pertained to enlightened notions of  
justice, democracy, and laissez-faire economics—in the com-
ing twentieth century. The recently unified German Kaiserreich 
seemed to demonstrate that a state could achieve its desired 
ends through means that were decidedly illiberal, and the Drey-
fus affair signaled that perhaps France was journeying down a 
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similar path. Thus, as Sherrod writes, British reportage of  the 
affair reflected “a subliminal sense of  national insecurity,” which 
highlighted “an intense concern about the future of  liberalism 
and the declining popularity of  liberal values in both Britain and 
Europe.”19 As one magazine in Edinburgh noted, “If  what is 
now springing up rankly in France is germinating throughout the 
world, then the beginning of  a new century may be a rude one, a 
terrible shaking, the end of  which no human foresight can pre-
dict.”20 But if  the British media were concerned about the future 
of  European liberalism, then the Dreyfus affair offered a rare 
opportunity for Britain to assume the mantle as the “true world 
leader and principal promoter of  civilization and progressive 
ways. The Affair demonstrated the fragility of  French claims in 
these respects.”21 This widespread sense of  disappointment with 
the apparent French descent into injustice and illiberalism was 
not only felt across the English Channel. In 1898, the French 
consul in Antwerp, Belgium, recorded a conversation in which 
a local dignitary in the Masonic Lodge said, “If  a war broke out 
between France and Germany, all of  the people would be happy 
to hear of  the defeat of  the [French] ‘Grand Nation,’ which has 
abdicated the ideas of  justice and humanity of  which she has 
been the guardian since 1789.”22
 Historian Ronald K. Huch identifies a British press that 
was quite brazen in its geopolitical motivations for covering the 
Dreyfus affair. Huch notes that there were protests throughout 
Britain after Dreyfus’s second conviction at Rennes, but the mo-
ment Dreyfus was pardoned, the country seemed to lose any 
sense of  outrage regarding the affair. Thus, while a small number 
of  British citizens continued their noble fight and claimed that 
a pardon was still unjust, most of  the population felt as though 
their task had been completed. Huch argues that this reaction 
was no surprise, writing, “In England, the reaction to the Rennes 
trial had always been more anti-French than pro-Dreyfus.”23 In 
other words, the British had used the affair as a means of  criticiz-
ing the French, stoking the centuries-old rivalry between the two 
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countries. The moment France realized the folly of  its ways and 
pardoned Dreyfus, however, the British no longer had anything 
to gain from attacking the French. Put simply, the fate of  Drey-
fus himself  was irrelevant.
 The aforementioned “J’accuse” was unquestionably the 
spark that ignited much of  the rhetoric surrounding the Dreyfus 
affair around the globe. This rhetoric had tangible consequences 
for French citizens living abroad. Indeed, in one February 1898 
report sent to the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, the Rotter-
dam consul in the Netherlands warned that “business with our 
country is suffering from the current crisis. A certain number of  
travelling French commerce agents have been recently recalled 
by their firms because they have not been able to conduct any 
business.”24 Reports such as this one solidified the belief  within 
the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs that the spread of  anti-
French commentary across Europe had to be halted.
 In Amsterdam, the French consul general reported that 
many of  Zola’s pamphlets had been translated into Dutch and 
were now appearing in the windows of  libraries across the city.25 
Equally concerning to the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs was the fact 
that two pro-Dreyfus French newspapers, Le Siècle and L’Aurore, 
were beginning to emerge on the shelves of  small boutiques in 
the Netherlands. The Amsterdam consul concluded that, since 
these newspapers were not being sold in the official kiosks that 
had a monopoly on the sale of  foreign newspapers, they must 
have been coming directly from Paris as a propaganda tool to 
sow anti-French discord.26 Hanotaux found this development so 
troubling that he forwarded the consul general’s message to his 
superior, Prime Minister Jules Méline, and to his colleague in 
the French cabinet, Minister of  War Jean-Baptiste Billot. The 
subtext in Hanotaux’s action is clear: the French government 
may not have been able to censor Le Siècle or L’Aurore within its 
own borders, but it certainly could attempt to prevent the illegal 
smuggling of  these Dreyfusard papers throughout Europe.
 In attempting to control the foreign press’s access to 
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French newspapers, the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs reached out 
to diplomats in neighboring countries. Only three days after Ha-
notaux received the news from his consul in Amsterdam, the 
Ministry of  the Interior sent him a separate message, asking Ha-
notaux to telegraph his German counterpart to see if  L’Aurore 
was sold there too.27 The French suspected that the newspaper 
had made its way to Germany either through Belgium or the 
Netherlands. Still, there is no evidence that the French govern-
ment solicited the Germans to ban the sale of  L’Aurore. Rather, 
it is likely that the French were attempting to uncover the extent 
of  the smuggling of  the newspapers, which they could then ad-
dress internally by preventing them from ever leaving France il-
legally in the first place.
Members of  the foreign press at the 1899 Rennes court-martial. 
From Cinq semaines à Rennes, deux cents photographies de Gerschel 
(Paris, France: F. Juven, 1900).
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***
 Although the French government had to exercise some 
degree of  caution in controlling the press abroad, it felt much 
more freedom in pursuing censorship of  the arts, particularly the 
theater. Even France itself, which had almost fully liberalized its 
press laws in 1881, did not end censorship of  the theater until 
1906. This was in part because in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
theater was considered even more influential than the press, as 
it was one of  the only ways through which the illiterate masses 
could be exposed to political caricature and criticism of  the rul-
ing elites.28 However, as the century progressed and the masses 
became more literate, the printed word surpassed plays as a more 
powerful medium for influencing public opinion. Nevertheless, 
the French government remained invested in censorship of  the-
atrical productions sympathetic to Dreyfus. In particular, the 
production of  a play entitled “Dreyfus, or the Martyr of  Devil’s 
Island,” which quickly spread across Europe, preoccupied the 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs in France. In a letter dated January 
17, 1898, French diplomats in Belgium first notified Minister Ha-
notaux about the play’s existence. Hanotaux and the French con-
sul of  Antwerp then worked together to find a way to outlaw the 
performance altogether.29 Despite their efforts, the play’s popu-
larity persisted and performances were carried out on a regular 
basis in countries such as Italy and the Netherlands. Although 
the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, with the cooperation of  
the Italian government, was able to suppress a production of  the 
play being staged in San Remo, Italy, Dreyfus’s mass appeal ren-
dered the play too difficult to suppress entirely. Indeed, not long 
after receiving the positive news regarding San Remo, Hanotaux 
confided to his consul in Amsterdam, “Are these performances 
still going on? I can only regret that they haven’t been forbidden 
like they were in The Hague.”30
 French efforts to suppress theater productions brought 
mixed results. On the one hand, the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs 
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did enforce the interdiction of  some performances, particularly 
in countries that maintained strong and beneficial diplomatic re-
lations with France. Unlike major European powers such as Brit-
ain or Germany, smaller European states understood that there 
was little to gain from consistently tarnishing France’s world 
standing. As a result, these smaller countries were more sympa-
thetic to France’s plight. As one Italian newspaper proclaimed, 
“We love France and we wish her only the best: we hope she 
stays in Europe as a leader of  civilization rather than of  barba-
rism.”31 These smaller European states were perhaps also wary 
that a similar scandal could befall them one day in this new mass 
media environment—they understood that by helping France 
now during this time of  need, they could rely upon the country 
to return the favor at a later date.
 Even for those European governments that did sympa-
thize with France, enacting censorship necessitated a calculation 
between the benefit of  helping France versus the social cost of  
enacting overly harsh suppression. In Amsterdam, for example, 
the French were unable to convince Dutch diplomats to ban the 
production of  “Devil’s Island.” On January 26, 1898, the Am-
sterdam consul general broke the news to Hanotaux, writing, “A 
prohibition would only create in the press an ardent polemic; the 
legality and the opportunity would be contested…It would be a 
redoubling of  commotion, extra publicity from which only those 
amateurs seeking scandal would benefit.”32 This must have come 
as a disappointment to Minster Hanotaux, but the failure illus-
trates the complicated position occupied by the French Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs when it came to the coverage of  the Dreyfus 
affair abroad. Although the press was much more of  a threat to 
public opinion given its ability to reach and affect more people, it 
was nearly impossible to censor the scandal through diplomatic 
channels due to the widespread freedom of  the press laws in Eu-
rope. All that was left to censor, then, were the cheap and often 
poorly attended “Boulevard theater” productions, such as “The 
Captain Dreyfus,” which was staged in Hamburg, Germany, in 
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February 1898. According to one Frenchman who attended the 
play on behalf  of  the French consul, the spectacle was terrible. 
“Poorly directed and without any artistic value,” he wrote, “there 
were at least as many whistles as there was applause.”33
An advertisement for an American play based on the 1899 work Devil’s Island: 
A Novel founded upon the famous Dreyfus case. Though there is no evidence the 
French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs ever sought to censor this particular 
production, plays such as this one were often the targets of  censorship efforts 
led by the ministry.
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 The French efforts to censor negative press in the arts 
constitute an early form of  so-called “cultural diplomacy.”34 This 
was, of  course, unlike the cultural diplomacy of  the Cold War, 
where cultural products were sent from the United States to 
the Soviet Union, and vice versa, in an effort to establish some 
degree of  understanding between the two enemy powers. In-
stead, in the French context, cultural diplomacy was a strategy 
implemented as a means of  shaping the cultural realm of  for-
eign countries in a way that was beneficial to French interests. 
Such efforts at cultural diplomacy were not deployed solely by 
the French. After the Rennes retrial and the decision to convict 
Dreyfus, masses across Europe petitioned their respective gov-
ernments to use cultural events to punish France. This took the 
form of  calls to boycott the 1900 World’s Fair, which was to 
be held in Paris. These demands began as early as 1898, albeit 
more quietly. One German newspaper first made the suggestion 
after Zola was convicted for libel following the publication of  
“J’accuse.”35 The French took these concerns seriously, for the 
World’s Fair was anticipated to be not only an economic boon 
for France, but also an opportunity to celebrate the country’s his-
tory and glory as one of  the great states of  Europe. Any boycott 
would have been a serious blow both to finance and national 
pride. In September 1899, the French consul at Hamburg alerted 
the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs about a German news article that 
suggested a boycott and also noted that “many very important 
American businesses have made the decision to send nothing to 
the Exposition if  the situation does not improve, and the busi-
ness world in England is set to follow this example as well.”36 As 
Michael Burns notes in his historical study of  the 1900 World’s 
Fair and the Dreyfus pardon, the risk of  losing the international 
festival played a significant role in pressuring the French govern-
ment to pardon Dreyfus following the Rennes verdict. As Burns 
asserts, 
[Prime Minister Pierre] Waldeck-Rousseau’s gov-
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ernment quickly realized that a pardon would 
serve many purposes: it would eliminate the very 
real possibility of  the prisoner’s death while in 
custody…The pardon would also serve to liber-
ate Dreyfus without exonerating him (and there-
by pacify many factions in France); and it would 
salvage the 1900 Exposition by calming interna-
tional protest.37
 Although the threats to boycott never derived from in-
dividual governments, the international community nevertheless 
exercised its own sort of  pressure on France, much like France 
did in its suppression of  foreign theater productions through 
cultural diplomacy.
***
 Across the Atlantic Ocean, the French made little if  any 
effort to engage with or amend the portrayal of  Alfred Drey-
fus in the United States. Perhaps in that country, where freedom 
of  speech was so deeply ingrained in the fabric of  society, the 
French recognized that any requests for censorship would either 
not be accepted or not be upheld. That is not to say, however, 
that the French ignored American coverage of  the Dreyfus af-
fair altogether. And there was indeed tremendous coverage of  
the scandal in the United States, which continued to crest lead-
ing up to and during the 1899 Rennes trial. As Egal Feldman, 
a scholar of  Jewish American history, records in his book The 
Dreyfus Affair and the American Conscience, for a country “aspir-
ing to play a meaningful, if  not heroic, role in the world, it was 
only natural that the attention of  Americans would be attracted 
to major political and social crises abroad.”38 Much of  the af-
fair was transmitted to the United States through British media 
outlets—only a few newspapers based out of  major cities in the 
United States could afford their own foreign correspondents to 
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travel to France and report on the unfolding events there—and 
consequently, a significant portion of  American coverage began 
to reflect certain British idiosyncrasies and perspectives. Most 
notably, this manifested into what Feldman terms an “Anglo-
American bond” in judicial procedures.39 A New York Times ar-
ticle from 1898 illustrates this tendency:
In France…there are no rules of  evidence…
Witnesses have appeared before the judges and 
have spoken their minds freely. They have not 
presented evidence. They have given their own 
opinions. They have expressed the opinions of  
others. They have repeated conversations that 
they have heard at second or third hand. All this 
is called testimony in Europe.40
 
Much of  this coverage can be interpreted as American self-con-
gratulation. The not-so-subtle subtext in articles such as these 
was that Dreyfus’s conviction never could have occurred in a 
more civilized or democratic nation such as the United States, 
where judicial procedures and norms were much more rational. 
In this regard, American press coverage hardly differed from the 
self-aggrandizement that historian Ricky Lee Sherrod detected 
in his study of  the British press.
 On the other hand, the French judiciary undeniably tol-
erated a great deal of  testimony that would have been impermis-
sible in the United States. During the Rennes court-martial, for 
instance, former French Minister of  War Auguste Mercier testi-
fied that German and British bankers had donated over thirty-
five million francs to mysterious forces—frequently referred to 
in the anti-Semitic, anti-Dreyfusard press as the so-called “Jew-
ish Syndicate”—who were working to exonerate Dreyfus.41 The 
French newspapers were left to rebut this claim, with one article 
in Le Figaro commenting, “Nothing is more unjust, nothing more 
slanderous, monstrous, however, than that accusation of  Gen-
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eral Mercier…It is an attempt to dishonor all those who fight for 
the triumph of  the truth.”42 Thus, in France, newspapers played 
the role of  quasi-arbiter, condemning false testimony when the 
judicial structure failed to do so. Still, to an American public un-
familiar with the intricacies of  French legal customs, testimony 
like Mercier’s was laughable and undermined justice.
 The French were well aware of  the growing power of  
the United States, and this sometimes manifested itself  as unrea-
sonable paranoia about the influence of  the American press. The 
most pronounced instance of  such fears transpired in December 
1897, when Minister Hanotaux sent a letter to the New York 
consul marked “very confidential,” inquiring into an alleged plot 
orchestrated by the New York newspaper the World to free Drey-
fus from Devil’s Island:
An individual who calls himself  Antoine de Bas-
tillac, and who has collaborated at the World in 
New York, recently passed through Paris, stating 
that he had participated in a plot that was orga-
nized a few months ago in the United States by 
the Israelite director of  the newspaper to remove 
Dreyfus; he assures that the project will soon be 
restarted and that an expedition will be organized 
in Louisiana to this end, under the pretext of  a 
shipment of  arms to Cuba. Do your best to pro-
vide me information on Bastillac and on what he 
alleges. If  need be, consult with your colleague in 
New Orleans.43
That the French believed such a complex scheme to be plausible 
speaks volumes about their perception of  the American press. 
Indeed, the French were so concerned about the possibility of  
such a plot that they even contacted Spain to request that the 
Spanish provide any intelligence they might have procured per-
taining to the alleged conspiracy. Such a plan never materialized 
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and was, of  course, no more than an elaborate fiction. Yet the 
seriousness with which the French government processed and 
reacted to this warning reveals a deep-seated fear of  the power 
of  the American press.
 If  French government officials feared American newspa-
per influence, they also often expressed disdain for the negative 
coverage that so frequently emanated from the United States. 
The reports sent from the Chicago consul to the French Minis-
try of  Foreign Affairs during the Rennes trial of  1899 were par-
ticularly indicative of  this French sentiment, which contained a 
powerful mix of  wounded pride and betrayal. In these letters, the 
Chicago consul compiled an impressive list of  grievances against 
the United States. From criticism of  the newspaper coverage 
itself, to jealousy over the country’s privileged position in the 
world, to dissatisfaction with the hypocrisy of  American society 
as a whole, these missives expressed in impassioned language the 
frustration felt by a proud Frenchman and diplomat serving his 
country in hostile isolation.
 In one of  the consul’s earliest letters to the Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs, dated August 24, 1899, the diplomat noted with 
contempt that every single newspaper in Chicago was support-
ing Dreyfus. This was compounded by the fact that, curiously, 
many pro-Dreyfus Frenchmen had been contributing articles to 
the American press, which had infused the local coverage with 
a heretofore unseen tenacity and proximity to the story. As the 
consul in Chicago observed, “Numerous French writers such 
as Bernard Lazare, Joseph Reinach, Marcel Prévost, and Clem-
enceau contribute regularly to this extraordinary service of  the 
American press, which we can say has been unanimously favor-
able to the condemned of  1894.”44 He later continued, “All good 
Frenchmen abroad cannot rid themselves of  an incommensurate 
sadness in the presence of  exaggerated interference of  the for-
eign press in a family affair.”45 Implied in these musings of  the 
consul was the belief  that the foreign press took an interest in the 
Dreyfus affair not for noble reasons of  justice, but instead due to 
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a voyeuristic fascination with watching and analyzing what he be-
lieved to be a private “family affair.” Thus, it must have been dis-
heartening for the diplomat to hear from an American journalist 
that “It is good style now to run down France; it makes money; 
it shows to France that there is something else than herself  and 
behind her in the world.”46
 Arguably the most fascinating aspects of  these letters 
from the consul in Chicago were his own interpretations of  
American society near the turn of  the twentieth century and the 
visible contradictions he discerned between the holier-than-thou 
tone expressed in American newspapers versus the actual news 
unfolding within the borders of  the United States. Of  particular 
interest was an anecdote reported by the consul in 1899, when a 
Jewish cadet was forced to leave the United States Military Acad-
emy in West Point, New York, following repeated anti-Semitic 
treatment from his classmates. On this issue, the consul in Chica-
go noted that the American press remained silent. “It is, anyhow, 
the third incident of  this sort that has occurred in recent years…
We are getting used to being treated in the manner in which 
we treat China…At home, we cover up all things,” he mused, 
mimicking the American thought process, “but when we need 
to provide something exciting to our readers, we demand light, 
always more light on the affairs of  France.”47 If  American anti-
Semitism and hypocrisy were not already disgraceful enough, 
the consul also hurled accusations at the Americans for being 
fortunate geographically, yet ungrateful to the French, who had 
helped secure American independence over a century earlier:
If  they had, to the west, a powerful Mexico pos-
sessing a fleet twice their size, and wealth, and an 
incommensurable means of  attacking them, the 
press of  this country would better understand 
the indignity of  its current behavior against our 
nation, which has poured its blood and given its 
gold, even when it was weak and fighting almost 
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without hope for its independence from which it 
has grown ever since.48
 The link between the foreign press and diplomacy was 
clear to the Chicago consul. In his view, the press was a tool with 
which geopolitical games could be conducted. This was by no 
means incorrect, for as has been noted earlier, the British press 
printed false stories about Dreyfus’s escape from Devil’s Island 
with the hopes that this would reignite the affair. Indeed, the 
British motivation for doing so was, as Ronald Huch contended, 
to help encourage anti-French sentiment and in turn promote 
the superiority of  the British.49 The French diplomat in Chicago 
perceived many similarities in American press coverage, specu-
lating that the country’s pro-Dreyfus sentiments stemmed from, 
above all, a desire for Anglo-American friendship: “I am con-
vinced that the American press would not be so violent against 
us, if  behind its movements existed the desire…to benefit their 
new British friends.”50 This is precisely what Egal Feldman spec-
ulates, referring to the Anglo-American friendship as “a redis-
covery of  a common Anglo-Saxon heritage, a ‘unique partner-
ship’; proposals were even made for an alliance or reunion of  the 
English-speaking people.”51 But the consul in Chicago was not 
only concerned with the burgeoning Anglo-American friend-
ship. In a letter sent on September 10, 1899, the French diplomat 
also reported that Kaiser Wilhelm II recently sent a German flag 
to Chicago and remarked to an American that “a war between 
Germany and the United States would be impossible.”52 For the 
French, witnessing this condemnation from both Britain and 
Germany must have been a gravely concerning diplomatic devel-
opment. Perhaps most frustrating of  all was the fact that France 
was powerless to control the American press. With regards to 
the United States, therefore, France found itself  in a subservient 
position, only able to express its displeasure in private dispatches 
sent back to the French Ministry of  Foreign Affairs in Paris.
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***
 Beyond Europe and the United States, France attempted 
to control the foreign discourse surrounding the Dreyfus affair 
with greater latitude, particularly in South America and India. No 
longer burdened by strictly enforced liberal freedoms granted to 
the press, the French could refocus their attention to influenc-
ing the printed word, which they never dared to do in Europe 
or the United States. Indeed, on September 19, 1897, Minister 
Hanotaux sent a telegram to the French consul in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil. “I understand that certain Brazilian newspapers are cov-
ering the Dreyfus Affair in order to spread negative press about 
the government of  the Republic,” the minister said, “I ask you 
to keep watch over this campaign, and if  necessary, refute the 
noise put into circulation.”53 The order coming from the French 
Ministry of  Foreign Affairs here was somewhat ambiguous—
perhaps Hanotaux was using a euphemism to advocate for di-
rect attempts at censorship of  the Brazilian newspapers. Even 
if  Hanotaux only meant for his consul in Rio to make a public 
denunciation of  the Brazilian press, this still demonstrated a de-
gree of  direct intervention into another country’s foreign affairs 
that France did not even attempt to employ in Europe.
 France still met some opposition in its quest to control 
the foreign press outside of  Europe. Perhaps the most glaring 
failure came in British-controlled India, following a particularly 
incendiary sermon given by the bishop of  Calcutta in Septem-
ber 1899. The speech, which was printed in its entirety in the 
local newspaper The Englishman, attacked the moral fiber of  the 
French state for allowing the Dreyfus affair to transpire in the 
first place, despite the recent pardon of  the artillery captain. The 
bishop began by lamenting the entire ordeal: “What has become 
then of  those high principles of  liberty, equality, and brother-
hood of  which France has been held to be the self-constituted 
exponent? What final interest can a nation possess save in truth 
and justice and equity?”54 Next, he issued an attack on France, 
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denouncing the French people with a flourish:
There are conditions of  a comity among nations 
as among individuals. We do not endow a man 
with our confidence if  he has proved guilty of  
some flagrant crime; at least until he has repent-
ed of  it. Nor can we stand upon friendly terms 
with a nation of  men which has violated the el-
ementary laws of  human truth and justice.55
Despite this disappointment in the French regime though, the 
bishop’s sermon concluded on an optimistic note:
Let us pray then that France, that great and gal-
lant nation, may know ere it be too late “the 
things which belong unto her peace.” Let us pray 
that she may cast off  the bondage of  that military 
spirit which idolizes and sanctifies mere force. 
Let us pray that she may turn her back upon the 
unhappy policy which has too often in public 
life ignored or dishonoured the sacred name of  
God. Let us pray that in her national history she 
may recognize and realise yet again the eternal 
principles of  truth and justice and equity.56
 Unsurprisingly, the French found this sermon to be 
harsh and unacceptable, going so far as to lodge an official com-
plaint with the British colonial government.57 Citing a number of  
different passages from the sermon, including one in which the 
bishop advocated a boycott of  the 1900 World’s Fair, the French 
consul general in Calcutta claimed that the sermon was “injuri-
ous” and “an act of  hostility against France.” Three weeks later, 
the French government received a response from the colonial 
government, which refused to apologize for the bishop’s behav-
ior:
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The government of  India can accept no respon-
sibility for statements on matters of  current in-
terest that may be uttered from the pulpit either 
by the metropolitan or by any Bishop or minis-
ter of  religion in India. Such a responsibility is 
not, so far as the government of  India are aware, 
assumed by the civil power in any country; and 
it would appear to be fatal to that freedom of  
thought and speech with which the pulpit among 
all civilized peoples is, by virtues of  its moral and 
spiritual authority, endowed.58
 This controversy helps reveal a crucial element of  the 
French response to the foreign press: the French government 
was concerned not only with newspaper coverage pertaining to 
the Dreyfus affair, but also with the spread of  information per-
taining to Dreyfus more generally, whether it be a sermon or a 
theater production. Nor did these goals seem to have any sort 
of  geographic limits—indeed even India, which was neither a 
French colony nor close to the European continent, was not ex-
empt from receiving the attention of  the French Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs.
***
 That the French government invested so many resources 
in the monitoring of  the foreign press served as a tacit acknowl-
edgement that the foreign press was among the primary engines 
driving the scandal of  the Dreyfus affair. The Ministry of  For-
eign Affairs had a rather simple strategy when it came to control-
ling coverage of  the affair: limit any discourse, positive or nega-
tive, pertaining to Alfred Dreyfus. The hope was that by limiting 
any kind of  knowledge, foreign populations would eventually 
lose interest in the drama of  the affair. Given the links between 
70     David Murrell
An Affair on Every Continent
foreign and French publications, this strategy might have served 
as a means of  minimizing French interest in the affair as well.
 As a result, within Europe the French government 
looked to control those elements of  the press that it could ma-
nipulate with ease. This frequently meant wielding France’s close 
diplomatic ties to its neighbors to engage in a sort of  “cultural 
diplomacy,” by which France could convince other countries to 
suppress certain theater productions about Dreyfus. In this cul-
tural realm, however, France experienced limited victories. The 
theater had been the primary means of  disseminating informa-
tion to the masses in the mid-nineteenth century, but by the turn 
of  the twentieth century, the masses of  Europe began to receive 
much of  their information from the press. And when France 
turned its sights to this newly influential European press, other 
states’ liberal press laws severely limited the country’s ability to 
restrict the growing discourse of  the Dreyfus affair.
 Meanwhile, in the United States, the French experienced 
no successes of  any sort. The American press viewed the Drey-
fus affair as a means of  solidifying its friendship with Britain 
and felt especially secure in knowing that the French could not 
censor them in any way. The only arena in which the French gov-
ernment could attempt to control both the press and the cultural 
sphere, therefore, was outside of  the United States and Europe. 
Even in these cases, however, the French experienced opposi-
tion. In a humiliating display of  its own weakness, the Minis-
try of  Foreign Affairs could not even manage to quell the anti-
French rhetoric of  an anonymous preacher in the British impe-
rial colony of  India. This incident served to demonstrate both 
the incredible spread of  information about Dreyfus’s plight, as 
well as the inability of  France to control foreign engagement 
with the scandal.
 Confronted by a new era in which the press acted as the 
engine of  knowledge and scandal in the world, the French were 
presented with a Sisyphean endeavor when it came to limiting 
the scope of  the Dreyfus affair. These forces would only con-
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tinue to swell in the coming twentieth century, as newspapers 
continued to exert a massive influence on society. Indeed, in the 
years leading up to the First World War, the German government 
also began to closely monitor the press as a means of  gauging 
public opinion. It too viewed the press as a device with which it 
could track and potentially influence the public.59 The Germans 
would soon find, as the French had before, that their patriotic 
press was ultimately impossible to control. The British would 
also come to learn this lesson, for in 1909, the famous “We 
want eight and won’t wait!” slogan propagated by the patriotic 
press and naval armament interest groups compelled the Liberal 
government to double its annual dreadnought production from 
four to eight ships.60 These were the same underlying forces that 
gripped France during the affair. The Dreyfus affair was thus a 
preview of  the powerful mass media and domestic pressures that 
would come to characterize twentieth-century European states.
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